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NETT ASSOCIATION, 
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BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS BENNETT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants' statement of the "Nature of the Case" 
is incorrect in one critical point: Defendant Downard's 
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crossclaim against the co-defendant8-appellants John-
sons and Clarks was and is based upon his construction 
contract with the Johnsons and the Clarks, as Owners, 
and not on any contract with Taco Siesta International. 
(See Amended Cross-Claim, Paragraph 1, R. 62; Con-
struction Contract, Defendants' Exhibit 1.) 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
Appellants' Brief correctly states the disposition of 
the case by the Lower Court, 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY 
RESPONDENTS BENNETT ON APPEAL 
Respondents Bennett seek the affirmance of the 
judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As it appears that the appellants' Statement of 
Facts is incorrect in some particulars, and omits the 
statement of other facts esablished which are deemed 
of crucial importance to an understanding of the issues 
of the case and the rendering of a judgment in accord-
ance with facts and the law, respondents are under the 
unfortunate necessity of controverting appellants' state-
ment in some particulars and restating the facts as we 
believe the record requires, trying to present the same 
as simply and intelligibly as possible. 
Defendants-Appellants, the Johnsons and Clarks, 
owned unimproved land in South Ogden. In the pro-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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motion of the enterprise involving the land, as herein-
after set out, they were all acting together as partners 
(R. 214-215.) On April 12, 1968, the Johnsons and the 
Clarks, in the promotion of this enterprise, and with the 
apparent purpose of improving the land and making it 
productive, entered into an "AGREEMENT" with Taco 
Siesta, Inc., a corporation. (Defendants' Exhibit 2.) 
This Agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2, contains two 
separate and distinct (even if related) agreements: First, 
the parties thereto, as a joint enterprise, and by their 
joint efforts and financing, undertake to construct a 
permanent building on the land, and second, effective as 
of the contemplated completion date of the building, the 
land with the improvements to be constructed is leased 
to Taco Siesta for a term of years at a stipulated rental. 
As the terms of this Agreement are of critical importance, 
we reproduce for the convenience of the court the follow-
ing material portions of this Agreement in which the 
Johnsons and Clarks are referred to as Lessors and Taco 
Siesta is called the Lessee: 
It is mutually understood and agreed by 
these respective parties that in order for the 
Lessee to enjoy the use of said property under 
the terms and provisions of this agreement that 
it is necessary to proceed with the construction 
of a building on said property and with relation 
to such construction project these respective par-
ties do understand and mutually agree as fol-
lows: 
That the Lessor herein will immediately 
upon the execution of this agreement make avail-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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able the sum of $30,000.00 to be used, as here-
inafter provided, for the construction of the 
building in accordance with the plans and speci-
fioations to be approved by the Lessor, and that 
all such funds will be placed with First Security 
State Bank of Salt Lake City under the direct 
supervision of a proper officer of said firm and 
to be disbursed by such officer in accordance 
with the terms and provisions of the construc-
tion agreement in connection with such project. 
Any unused funds to remain to credit of Lessor. 
That the Lessee will immediately upon the 
execution of this agreement provide, at the sole 
expense of the Lessee, the necessary plans and 
specifications in connection with such construc-
tion project, all of which will be subject to the 
final approval of the Lessor. Lessee will engage 
in a contract with a suitable contractor, duly 
bonded, for the construction of such project in 
accordance with the plans and specifications, 
with the right in the Lessee at all times and at 
the expense of the Lessee to inspect such con-
struction project during the process of construc-
tion, and with the further right in the Lessee to 
approve the particular contractor selected to 
construct such project and in the determination 
of the contract; price of construction. 
That the Lessee will be solely responsible 
for the payment of any and all sums necessary 
to complete said building and improvement pro-
ject, mutually decided upon, over and above the 
said $30,000.00 to be provided by the Lessor 
herein, and in the event any such excess funds 
are necessary that they will be provided prompt-
ly by the Lessee in order that such project of 
construction will not be delayed in any manner. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The next paragraph of the Agreement originally pro-
vided that the Lessor would provide a concrete retaining 
wall on the property, but this was amended by the par-
ties by interlineation to provide that in lieu of the wall 
the Lessor would provide an additional $2,000.00 in 
money. 
While the Agreement provided that the terms of the 
leasehold would begin 5 days after notice of completion 
of the building, it contained an additional provision that 
in any event the term would start not longer than 
90 days from the date of notice by the Lessor that the 
construction funds were available. Rental was payable 
from the beginning of the term at the rate of $650 per 
month. 
The Johnsons and Clarks borrowed the $32,000.00 
which was to be their contribution to the cost of building 
construction from First Security State Bank in Salt Lake. 
(R. 250-251.) The proceeds of this loan were set up by 
the bank in a special account for the benefit of the John-
sons and the Clarks but under the control of a hank 
officer, as apparently contemplated by their construc-
tion Agreement with Taco Siesta. (Defendants' Exhibit 
4, R. 251-256.) 
Building plans were prepared and approved, and 
anarcbitect, Joe Lewis Wilkins, retained to supervise 
construction. The record seems to be silent or unclear 
as to just who retained Mr. Wilkins. 
Under date of August 25, 1968, a "Standard Form 
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of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor" was exe-
cuted. It recites that it is between "Claris E. Johnson 
. . . the owner, and Arnel K. Downard Construction Co., 
the contractor." In the space provided for the "owner" 
it is signed "Joe Lewis Wilkins, TACO SIESTA for 
Clair Johnson." The contract appears to be a printed 
form of document provided by the American Institute 
of Architects, and contains minimal provisions. It is 
noteworthy that nowhere in the contract is there any 
provision whatsoever which requires the contractor 
Downard to pay laborers and materialmen furnishing 
labor or materials for the building construction. The 
agreed contract price is $31,860.00, exclusive of landscap-
ing, blacktop and fill. 
On the same day, pursuant to demand made upon 
him by the Johnsons and Clarks, the contractor Downard 
procured from United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany an Indemnity Bond in the amount of $31,860.00 
running to the appellant Claris E. Johnson as Obligee. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, Johnsons' testimony, R. 257, 266 
and 267.) 
Because the additions of this Bond are also of criti-
cal importance, we set out as follows the essential con-
ditions of the Bond. 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE CONDITION 
OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH, That if 
the said Principal shall well and truly perform 
and fulfill all and every covenants, conditions, 
stipulations and agreements in said contract 
mentioned to be performed and fulfilled, and 
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shall keep the said Obligee harmless and indem-
nified from and against all and every claim, de-
mand, judgment, lien, cost and fee of eveory de-
scription incurred in suits or otherwise against 
the said Obligee, growing out of or incurred in 
the prosecution of said work according to the 
terms of said contract, and shall repay to the 
said Obligee all sums of money which the said 
Obligee may pay to other persons on account 
of work and labor done or materials furnished 
on or for said contract, and if the said Principal 
shall pay to the said Obligee all damages or for-
feitures which may be sustained by reason of the 
non-performance or mal-perfbrmance on the part 
of the said Principal of any of the covenants, 
conditions, stipulations and agreements of said 
contract, then this obligation shall be void; 
otherwise the same shall remain in full force 
and virtue. 
The Surety shall not be liable under this 
bond to the Obligees, or either of them, unless 
said Obligees, or either of them, shall make pay-
ments to the Principal strictly in accordance 
with the terms of said contract as to payment 
and shall perform all the other obligations to 
be performed under said contract at the time 
and in the manner therein set forth. 
It is to be noted that the Bond runs only to the 
Owner as Obligee, and does not run "to all other persons 
as their interest may appear," (Laborers and material-
men) as required by Section 14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953. 
This Bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, according to John-
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son, was supplied to him shortly after "we started the 
job." (R. 257, Lines 3 to 10.) 
It must also be noted that the Bond, Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit B, not only runs to Claris E. Johnson as Obligee, 
but recites that the Principal (Downard) "has executed 
and entered into a certain contract with said Obligee 
dated 8/25/68 CONSTRUCTION TACO SIESTA FA-
CILITY AT 3715 SOUTH WASHINGTON, SOUTH 
OGDEN, UTAH, in. said contract described . . ." From 
the time he had received that Bond sometime in August 
of 1968, or very shortly thereafter, when work on the 
contract was just beginning, appellant Johnson had in-
formation sufficient to put him on inquiry as to his being 
the Owner named in the construction contract referred 
to. 
With this knowledge Johnson proceeded to act as 
the Owner and dealt directly with the contractor Down-
ard throughout the construction procedures. Periodically 
during the construction work as Mr. Downard got under-
way with the building abstraction under his contract 
with Mr. Johnson, and as each progress payment be-
came due, Mr. Downard would present Mr. Johnson 
with a statement of monies owing sub-contractors, ma-
terialmen, et cetera, and then Johnson and Downard 
would go to the bank and exhibit the bills submitted by 
Downard, and the bank would give to Johnson its check 
in an amount sufficient to pay the bills and progress 
payment. Mr. Johnson would endorse the bank check 
and deposit it in a special account which he and his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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partners had caused to be set up in his name as man-
aging partner so that he could make the payments for 
sums due Downard. Then Johnson would make checks 
to Downard and to sub-contractors and Downard for the 
amounts due and owing and deliver those personal checks 
on the special account to Downard. However, on some 
occasions the bank's check was endorsed directly to 
Downard or to sub-contractor and delivered to him rather 
than clearing through Johnson's special peirsonal ac-
count. (R. 254, Line 12 to 256, Line 19; Defendants' 
Exhibit 4.) Johnson never gave a check or cash to Taco 
Siesta out of the account. (R. 256, Line 30 to 257, Line 
2.) Taco Siesta never paid Downard any money on the 
contract. When he started the job he had nothing to 
do with anyone except with the Own&r. Johnson per-
sonally asked Downard to furnish the Bond, plaintiffs' 
Exhibit B and Johnson never told Downard to get any 
of his money from Taco Siesta. (R. 277 to 280.) 
Although the Agreement of April 12, 1968, (Defen-
dants' Exhibit 2) required the Johnsons and Clarks to 
posit $32,000.00 for the construction costs of the building 
to be built in cooperation with Taco Siesta, and the con-
tract with Downard provided that the Owners would 
pay Downard $31,860.00 exdusve of landscaping, black-
top and fill, and Johnson undertook, to make the pay-
ments direct to Downard or to Downard and the sub-
contractors, Johnson, in breach of both contracts, de-
ducted various amounts, and, by his own sworn testi-
mony, paid Downard or his sub-contractors only a total 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
of $29,179.81 (R, 253-254), leaving Downard without 
funds to pay materialmen like the plaintiffs. This was 
in breach of the condition of the Contractor's Bond pro-
viding that surety should not be liable to the Obligees 
(Johnsons) unless the Obligees "shall make payments 
to the Principal (Downard) strictly in accordance with 
the terms of said contract as to payment . . ." And this, 
of course, was done after he had received the Bond from 
Downard and had notice of its contents and of the fact 
therein contained that Downard's contract specified 
Johnson as the Owner obligated thereunder. 
I t is undisputed that plaintiffs Bennett furnished 
materials and labor used in the construction of the build-
ing of the reasonable value claimed, upon which Johnson 
made on part payment by his personal check (Defen-
dants' Exhibit 3) dated May 17, 1969, leaving a balance 
owing Bennetts in the amount for which judgment was 
rendered. 
When the unpaid balance was not fortcoming, Mr. 
Winters, Credit Manager for Bennetts, telephoned Mr. 
Claris Johnson at a Salt Lake number (Johnson's place 
of employment) furnished by Downard and received as-
surances from Mr. Johnson that tilings were going to 
work out. I t would just take time. There were several 
conversations over a period of time but no collection 
was effected and finally Mr. Johnson indicated that there 
was a Bond that would provide protection. Winters 
asked for a copy of the Bond and Johnson replied he 
didn't have the Bond and would have to get the informa-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion. Winters asked for a copy of the Bond and Johnson 
indicated that Winters could have a copy but failed to 
produce it. He did, however, furnish him over the tele-
phone the number of the Bond and advised that it had 
been written by a man named Squires at the Eastman 
Hatch Company. Mr. Winters called Squires, who told 
him that the Bond was not a standard performance or 
payment Bond as known in the construction industry 
and that the Bond accrued not to the protection of 
materialmen and suppliers but accrued to the protec-
tion of Mr. Johnson from the failure of Mr. Downard, 
and if there was a loss resulting the claim against the 
Bond would have to be filed by Mr. Johnson. He called 
Mr. Johnson again and again asked for a copy of the 
Bond and was told that Bennetts could have a copy of 
it, but the Bond copy never came, although Johnson ad-
mitted he had the Bond in his files in Ogden. (R. 233 
to 236.) Mr. Winters checked with the Recorder's Office 
and found that Johnsons and Clarks were owners of 
record, and assumed that they were the contracting own-
ers in the light of the facts disclosed to him. (R. 241 
and R. 239.) 
Mr. Johnson testified he recalled Mr. Winters calling 
him in Salt Lake several times about the matter. He 
recalls telling Mr. Winters that he had the Bond in 
Ogden and that perhaps the easiest way to get a copy 
was to contact Eastman Hatch Company, who handled 
the transaction. While Mr. Johnson testified that he 
did not "refuse" to show Mr. Winters the Bond, there 
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is absolutely no contention made that he ever did fur-
nish a copy or exhibit the Bond to Mr. Winters. (R. 289 
to 292.) Johnson admitted he could be mistaken about 
his recoEection that he wasn't requested to take the 
Bond out of his file and bring it to Salt Lake to show 
it to Mr. Winters. (R. 294.) 
The jury brought in a special verdict, quoted by 
appellants in their statement of facts, to the effect that 
the defendants Johnson and Clark had failed to exhibit 
the Bond to the representative of the Bennetts upon 
request made, and judgment for the plaintiff followed 
pursuant to the statute. At the beginning of the trial 
the Bennetts moved for judgment against defendants 
Johnson and Clark upon the ground that it appeared, 
without controversy, that they were the owners of the 
property improved, that they contracted with Taco Si-
esta for the making of the improvements and ratified and 
adopted the construction contract with Downard as their 
contract, and that the Bond was insufficient as a matter 
of law in that it does not meet the statutory require-
ments. The motion was denied. (R. 213-214.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE JOHNSONS 
AND CLARKS WITH TACO SIESTA (DE-
FENDANTS' EXHIBIT 2) AND THE CON-
STRUCTION CONTRACT (DEFENDANTS' 
EXHIBIT 1) THEREIN PROVIDED FOR 
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ARE IN EFFECT ONE CONTRACT FOR 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR LAND, 
AND INTEREST THEREIN, BRINGING 
THEM WITHIN THE BOND REQUIRE-
MENTS OF SECTIONS 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2, 
U. C. A. 
Because the AGREEMENT (Defendants' Exhibit 
2) specifically refers to and requires that a contract be 
entered into for the construction of a restaurant facility 
upon the lands owned by the Johnsons and Clarks, it 
must be construed together with the construction con-
tract (Defendants' Exhibit 1) executed for them by the 
architect on the job and by them ratified and adopted by 
their subsequent acceptance of the benefits and recog-
nition of their obligations to make payments thereunder, 
and their control of such payments, after notice that the 
contract had been executed in Johnson's name. DeLuxe 
Glass Company v. Martin, 116 Ut. 144, 208 P. 2no 1127, 
Headnote 2, (relied on by appellants) and cases therein 
cited. 
It is noteworthy that said AGREEMENT recites 
the understanding and agreement of the parties thereto 
that "in order for the Lessee to enjoy the use of said 
property . . . it is necessary to proceed with the construc-
tion of a building on said property . . ." Further, by that 
Agreement the plans are subject to the approval by the 
Lessor, and the construction contractor must be duly 
bonded. It is also particularly noteworthy that the par-
ties to this Agreement thought it necessary to specific-
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ally provide that the Lessee (Taco Siesta) should have 
"the right . . . to inspect such construction project dur-
ing the process of construotion, and with the further 
right in the Lessee to approve the particular contractors 
selected to construct such project . . ." (Emphasis Sup-
plied.) And it also must be remembered that the contract 
provided that the Johnsons and Clarks would pay the 
full contemplated costs of construction through their 
own disbursing agent. 
It is also obvious, and noteworthy, that the restaur-
ant building contemplated was one of a permanent na-
ture, which would not only make the leasehold useful 
to the Lessee, but would be a permanent improvement 
upon the reversionary ownership of the Johnsons and 
the Clarks. Under the recitals in the Agreement, it is 
also obvious and apparent that the building was neces-
sary in order to secure to the Johnsons and the Clarks 
the reserved rentals provided for, which in themselves 
constitute an interest in land. And it is undisputed that 
the Johnsons and the Clarks were the owners of the fee 
in the land to be improved by the construction of the 
building. Certainly this constitutes an "interest in land" 
within the meaning of the statute! 
The provisions of Utah Statutes "are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the stat-
utes and to promote justice." Section 68-3-2, U. C. A. 
Furthermore this court has ruled that the Bond Statutes 
in question must be interpreted and applied in such 
manner as to carry out the purpose for which they were 
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created: To protect those who supply labor and mater-
ials^ and that they are akin to the Mechanics lien Stat-
utes in that they are designed to prevent a landowner 
from taking the benefit of improvements placed on his 
property without paying for labor and materials that 
went into it. Metals Manufacturing Company v. Bank 
of Commerce, 16 Ut. 2nd 74, 395 Pac. 2nd 914; King 
Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Ut. 2nd 
339, 374 Pac. 2nd 254, 21 Ut. 2nd 43, 440 Pac. 2nd 17. 
Giving the statutes in question the required liberal 
construction to effect the protection of the materialmen, 
Bennetts, and to avoid the unjust enrichment of the 
owners of the property improved, it seems too clear for 
argument that the Johnsons and Clarks, as the owners 
of the fee, and of the reserved rentals under the lease 
intended to take effect on completion of the building, 
were the owners of "any interest" in the land which was 
improved in part by Bennett's contribution, within the 
meaning of the statute. 
It is respectfully submitted that it is also abundantly 
clear that the AGREEMENT between the Johnsons and 
the Clarks and Taco Siesta providing for the construction 
of improvements on the lands of the former before the 
effective date of the lease to the latter^ considered in 
connection with the construction contract in the name 
of Claris Johnson, the managing partner of the Johnson-
Clark partnership, adopted and ratified by Johnson's 
acts, and the bond itself, demanded and received by 
Johnson and naming him as the owner with whom Down-
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ard had contracted to construct the building, construed 
as part of the same transaction, constitute together a 
contract for the improvement of the lands of the John-
sons and the Clarks as owners within the meaning of 
the Bonding Statute. 
In this connection it should be noted that there is 
not one scintilla of evidence to show that Bennetts had 
any knowledge or notice of the provisions of the Agree-
ment, Defendants' Exhibit 2 stating that the Lessee 
(Taco Siesta) will engage in a contract with a suitable 
contractor for the construction of the project. Nor is 
there one scintilla of evidence that Taco Siesta itself 
ever did enter into any such contract with the contractor 
Downard. And, in this connection, it is the established 
law of Utah that suppliers of material for the improve-
ment of realty are not bound by the unknown provisions 
of private contracts between the landlord and a tenant 
with respect to the installation of improvements on the 
real property, as it would be unfair to bind such sup-
pliers to the terms of agreements to which they were 
not parties and of whose content they had no knowledge. 
See Metals Manufacturing Company, supra, quoted in 
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Ut. 
2nd 43, 440 Ptetc. 2nd 17, 18. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the arrange-
ment between the Johnsons and the Clarks and Taco 
Siesta was in effect a joint business enterprise and one 
in which Taco Siesta was in effect the agent of the John-
sons and the Clarks in making inquiries as to Downard's 
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availability and probable price as a construction con-
tractor. As to the joint venture, see 
Parker v. Trefry (CaL), 136 Pac. 2nd 55; 
Garrett v. Kimbrel (Colo.). 376 Pac. 2nd 376; 
and 
In Re Schmidt (7th Circuit), 320 Fed. 2and 213. 
And, in Mid-West Engineering Construction Com-
pony v. Campagna (Mo.), 397 S. W. 2nd 616, it was 
held that whenever a lease contains a covenant requir-
ing the Lessee to make improvements of substantial and 
permanent nature, the Lessee is the agent of the Lessor 
for the purposes of subjecting the Lessor's reversion to 
mechanics liens incident to the making of such improve-
ments. It must be remembered that this honorable court 
has, as indicated, held that our Bonding Statutes here 
involved are exactly analogous to our mechanics lien laws. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the con-
tractual arrangements for the improvement of the lands 
belonging to the Johnsons and the Clarks amounted to 
contracts for the improvement of their lands requiring 
them to provide a good and sufficient Bond as required 
by Section 14-2-1, U. C. A. King Brothers, Inc., supra, 
cited and relied on by appellants, does not support ap-
pellants' position, but rather the position of the Bennetts. 
It resulted in a mandate of this Honorable Court to 
enter Judgment in favor of the plaintiff materialmen 
against the defendant sued as an owner of an interest 
in the land in question. 
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POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT FOR P L A I N T I F F S 
SHOUL BE AFFIRMED IN ANY EVENT 
BECAUSE THE BOND F U R N I S H E D 
(PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B) FAILS TO 
MEET THE MANDATORY R E Q U I R E -
MENTS OF SECTION 14-2-1, U. C. A., AND 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE OF THE LEGAL INSUFFICIEN-
CY OF SAID BOND. 
The conditions of the Bond obtained by Claris E. 
Johnson for his partnership are (1) that the contractor 
shall perform the covenants and agreements of the con-
struction contract, (2) the contractor shall indemnify 
the owner Johnson from all claims, demands, costs et 
cetera, against the Obligee Johnson growing out of the 
contract work, (3) the contractor shall repay Johnson 
all monies paid to other persons on account of labor 
done or materials furnished for the contract, and (4) 
the contractor shall pay the Obligee Johnson all damages 
sustained by reason of the non-performance or mal-per-
formance of the contractr of covenants and conditions of 
the construction contract. If the contractor Downard 
performs those obligations, then the Bond is void, other-
wise in full force. It contains no provisions, as required 
by the statute, for the prompt payment for material 
furnished and labor performed under the contract. It 
does not purport to run to "other persons as their inter-
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ests may appear," as required by the statute. It does 
refer to the construction contract between Johnson and 
Downard, but that "short fonn" contract, Defendants' 
Exhibit 1 contains no provisions whatsoever by which 
Downard specifically covenants and agrees to pay for all 
material furnished and labor performed in the construc-
tion work. In this it differs very materially from the 
construction contract involved in the principal case relied 
on by appellants Johnson and Clark, as we shall make 
clear. 
Thus, in the case before the court, even though the 
requirements of the contract are to be read into the Bond, 
there is no provision providing for the payment of labors 
and materialmen. It is purely a Bond to indemnify 
Johnson against loss or claims: In effect it is an insur-
ance policy for Johnson insuring him, and him alone, 
against loss or damage arising out of Downard's activi-
ties in the performance of the consitruction contract. It 
will be recalled that Bennett's Credit Manager, Mr. 
Winters, at the suggestion of Mr. Johnson called Mr. 
Squires at the Eastman Hatch Company, which was the 
agency for the bonding company and inquired about the 
Bond, and Squires^ in giving his own initerpi^tation of 
the Bond he had written, told Mr. Winters that the Bond 
was not a standard performance or payment bond where 
materialmen could make claims against the Bonds and 
that the Bond accrued not to the protection of material-
men but to the protection of Mr. Johnson only, who had 
the sole right to file a claim thereon. (R. 236.) It is 
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submitted that this interpretation of the Bond by the 
bonding company's agent who wrote the same removes 
any doubt, and that the Bond is only an indemnity for 
Johnson upon which the Bennetts have no claim. Ac-
cordingly it does not provide the protection required by 
the statute and the Johnsons and Clarks, as owners bene-
fitted, are liable. 
The appellants in their brief cite and rely upon 
DeLuxe Glass Company v. Martin, 116 Ut. 144, 208 Pac. 
2nd 1127. The case is not in point and has no application 
to the facts here before the court. In DeLuxe Glass Com-
pany, the Bond required the principal (contractor) to 
"perform and fulfill all the . . . agreements of said con-
tract . . ." The construction contract there specifically 
provided that "the contractor shall provide and pay for 
all materials, labor, . . . and other facilities necessary" 
for completion of the work. This court very properly and 
correctly ruled that the provision of the Bond guaran-
teeing performance of this clause in the construction 
contract was in effect a provision for the Benefit of ma-
terialmen and laborers as third party beneficiaries, who 
could bring their action thereon. However, in the con-
struction contract now before the court there is no pro-
vision comparable to the quoted provision in the DeLuxe 
Glass Company contract. The managing partner John-
son recognized this when he insisted on personally pay-
ing all approved bills. 
Inasmuch as the Bond now before the court does 
not protect Bennetts, even when the construction con-
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tract is read as a part of the Bond, the Bond is obviously 
insufficient and fails to provide the Bennetts the protec-
tion required by the statute, and accordingly upon con-
sideration of these insufficiencies in the Bond they were 
entitled, as a matter of law to their judgment against 
the Johnsons and Clarks as owners of the property bene-
fitted by the Bennetts' materials and labors. 
The case now at bar is governed by this court's later 
decision in Boise-Payette Lumber Company v. Phoenix 
Indemnity Company, 3 Ut. 2nd 150, 280 Pac. 2nd 448. 
In that case this court distinguished DeLuxe Glass Com-
pany, supra, noting the absence of any provision in the 
construction contract by which the contractor agreed to 
pay laborers and materialmen, and that the Bond only 
provided for indemnification of loss or damages by rea-
son of the failure of the Principal (contractor) "to faith-
fully perform said contract," ruled that DeLuxe Glass 
Company was not applicable and that the Bond neither 
directly or indirectly gave protection to the materialmen, 
but only to the owner, and that therefore the material-
men had his cause of action under the statute against 
the owner. There are no later Utah decisions on the point 
in question, and Boise-Payette Lumber Company, supra, 
now states the law of the State of Utah to the facts now 
before the court. 
There is another reason why the Bond in the case 
at bar is insufficient to satisfy the statute in question: 
It is totally void by reason of the breach of the terms 
thereof by the Obligees, the defendants Johnson and 
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Clark. This would be true even if the Bennetts, contrary 
to the considerations above set out, could be held to be 
third party beneficiaries of the bonding company's obli-
gation to the Johnsons and Clarks and entitled to sue 
thereon if the Johnsons and Clarks could sue thereon. 
It will be recalled that the Bond contained a specific 
provision that "the surety shall not be liable under this 
Bond . . . unless said Obligees, or either of them, shall 
make payments to the Principal {Downard) strictly in 
accordance with the terms of said contract as to pay-
ment . . ." (Emphasis Supplied.) 
The contract and the Bond required Johnson and 
Clark as owners to pay the contractor Downard $31,-
860.00, exclusive of landscaping, blacktop and fill, as the 
contract price. However, it will be remembered that 
Johnson, in breach of this condition of the Bond ad-
mitted and testified under oath that he paid Downard 
or his sub-contractors a total of only $29,179.81. (R. 253-
254.) And it will be remembered that Johnson himself 
managed and controlled all payments directly. 
This manifestly breached the condition of the Bond 
so that the bonding company was released even from 
its agreed direct liability to Johnson. Clearly where the 
direct Obligee had no claim against the company, one 
holding a derivative claim as a possible third party bene-
ficiary, could have no claim. 
Accordingly there was no effective Bond to protect 
the Bennetts, by reason of Johnson's breach and default, 
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and Bennetts are entitled to have their judgment against 
the owners affirmed for failure to provide and maintain 
an effective Bond to protect the Bennetts as material-
men and laborers. 
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing con-
siderations require that the judgment below be affirmed, 
and make it unnecessary to consider other questions 
raised by the appellants. However, as in duty bound, 
and in an attempt to assist the court, we shall consider 
the other points involved. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DE-
NYING JOHNSON AND CLARK'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS BENNETTS' COMPLAINT. 
Under POINT I of the ARGUMENT in appellants' 
brief, the appellants contend that the court should have 
granted their motion, made at the conclusion of the evi-
dence, for the dismissal of Bennetts' complaint. This 
contention, is in turn based upon the unfounded assump-
tion that the facts and evidence show that there was no 
contract entered into by the Johnsons and the Clarks 
for the construction of the building in question upon the 
land admittedly owned by the Johnsons and Clarks. We 
shall not burden the court with a repetition of the evi-
dence presented, as hereinbefore set out in our Statement 
of Facts, but shall merely recall that the basis AGREE-
MENT, Defendants' Exhibit 2, between the Johnsons 
and the Clarks and Taco Siesta was itself clearly and un-
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disputedly "a contract involving $500 or more for the 
cx>nstmction . . . of any building . . . upon land," within 
the terms of the statute. And in recognition of the obli-
gation of the owners, Johnson and Clark, it required 
that the actual contractor to be selected (with only the 
"approval" of the Lessee), to be "duly bonded." Further, 
Johnson demanded and received from Downard a Bond 
to indemnify him. The trouble was, that the Bond was 
in substance an indemnity bond for Johnsons and Clarks, 
and not a payment bond for laborers and materialmen, 
and it was invalidated by Johnson's breach thereof in 
refusing to pay Downard the full amount of the contract 
price, as required by the terms thereof. 
Furthermore, the actual construction contract with 
Downard was in the name of Johnson, the managing 
partner for the Johnsons and Clarks, a role which he, 
with notice of that fact in the Bond, proceeded to accept 
and exploit by controlling all of the payments made out 
of the funds provided by Johnsons and Clarks, as con-
tracting owners, for the ramstnKJtion of the building on 
their land. And the jury, after hearing all of the evidence 
and the arguments of counsel, found that it was proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, 
Johnson, was a party to the construction contract with 
Downard, Defendants' Exhibit 1. Clearly there is some 
evidence to support the jury's verdict, which is therefore 
conclusive. We respectfully submit that the trial court 
committed no error in denying the motion of defendants 
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Johnson and Clark for dismissal of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DE-
NYING JOHNSON AND CLARK'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS DEFENDANT DOWNARD'S 
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THEM. 
In responding to this issue raised by "POINT II" 
of the appellants' brief, the Bennetts should observe that 
they are only indirectly interested in Mr. Downard's 
judgment against the Johnsons and the Clarks for the 
balance due on his construction contract. They do not 
have an interest, as they have a judgment against Down-
ard, but it would appear that Downard can pay Bennetts 
only if the Johnsons and Clarks pay him what what they 
owe. However Bennetts wish only to be paid once for 
their materials and labor. 
No doubt Mr. Downard's counsel will argue this 
matter more fully, but Bennetts are content to submit 
this matter upon the evidence hereinbefore summarized, 
and upon the special verdict of the jury to the effect 
that Johnson was a party to and bound by the construc-
tion contract made in his name by the architect and 
accepted and confirmed by him in his name by the archi-
tect and accepted and confirmed by him by his subse-
quent actions. Perhaps it might be helpful to the court 
to add that even if the contract had been executed be-
tween Taco Siesta and Downard, the Johnsons and 
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Clarks would be bound thereby because, as heretofore 
indicated, the formation of the contract, if made by 
Taco Siesta, would have been in furtherance of a joint 
enterprise, and Taco Siesta was, under the basic agree-
ment, Defendants' Exhibit 2, the effective agent of the 
Johnson and the Clarks for the purpose of effecting a 
a construction contract lor the improvement of their 
land so that it could be leased to Taco Siesta. 
There was no error in the trial court's denial of ap-
pellants' motion to dismiss Downard's cross-claim against 
the Johnsons and Clarks. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2. 
Under POINT III of their brief the appellants John-
son and Clark take exception to the court's submitting 
to the jury interrogatory number 2, with the related ex-
planation, inquiring whether it was proved by a prepond-
erance of the evidence that the defendant Johnson was 
a party to the construction contract Defendants' Exhibit 
1. Appellants contend that there was no evidence what-
soever in the record to justify the submission of this 
issue to the jury for decision. Apparently not only the 
court, but the jury disagree with appellants' position, 
for the jury unanimously returned its special verdict 
to the effect that it was proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Johnson was a party to the construc-
tion contract. 
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This contention of appellants is a clear sample of 
"wishful thinking," for the record of the testimony and 
the exhibits are replete with evidence supporting the 
conclusion that Johnson, as managing partner of appel-
lants' partnership, was a party to the construction con-
tract. 
First, the basic agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2, 
providing for the construction of the building to improve 
appellants' land at their expense, clearly establishes a 
joint enterprise for such cx)nstruction, in which each par-
ty would be the agent of the other for the purpose of 
accomplishing the project,, and also the agency of Taco 
Siesta for the owner in obtaining a contractor to accom-
plish this basic purpose. The evidence clearly establishes 
that the architect, Wilkins, was retained as the acting 
representative of the parties to the joint enterprise. Al-
though Downard admitted that he quoted a construction 
contract price, in the first instance, to a Taco Siesta 
representative, he further testified that in this case, as 
in other cases in which he had built restaurants for own-
ers leasing to T&co Siesta, his dealing with respect to 
the actual contract and the performance thereof were 
entirely with the property owners. The architect Wilkins 
prepared a printed form of construction contract in the 
name of appellant Johnson, the managing partner, and 
pursuant to the authority contained in the basic agree-
ment, signed the same for Johnson. Johnson himself 
admitted, under oath, that he, as owners' representative, 
personally demanded of Downard that he be furnished 
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with a contractor's surety bond, and that pursuant to 
this demand the Bond was mailed to him sometime in 
August, shortly alter the amstruction contract was signed 
and the job began. This, bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, 
specifically names Claris E. Johnson as the Obligee and 
recites that the Principal Downard has executed and 
entered into a certain contract "with said Obligee" for 
the construction of the restaurant. Johnson, apparently 
an experienced businessman, never took any exception 
to this recital in the Bond, but instead of turning over 
the agreed amount of money to Taco Siesta, proceeded 
personally to make all progress payments to Downard 
and the sub-contractors and materialmen out of the funds 
furnished by the appellants Johnson and Clark. The un-
contradicted testimony of both Downard and Johnson 
is to the effect that Johnson never told Downard that 
he should deal with Taco Siesta rather than with John-
son as the contracting owner, but personally paid to 
Downard and/or the sub-contractors all of the sums of 
money due under the construction contract, and con-
trolled the same, paying on every occasion with checks 
either personally signed by Johnson as maker, or made 
by the lending bank to Johnson and Clark and endorsed 
by them and delivered to Downard or the sub-contrac-
tors. 
So far as the appellants' contention that there is no 
evidence that Johnson knew that the contract had been 
executed by Wilkins for Johnson, the statement made 
in the brief is just completely unjustified in view of the 
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record, and particularly in view of the fact that the con-
tractor's Bond, Exhibit B, received by Johnson, recites 
that Johnson is a party to the contract. Johnson is clear-
ly charged, as a matter of law, with notice of the con-
tents of the Bond demanded by and furnished to him. 
He had the means and the opportunity in his hands to 
establish this fact, and Bennetts were certainly not 
charged with any notice to the contrary. 
It is the established and unvarying rule of this 
Honorable Court, under the Constitution of Utah relat-
ing to jury trials, that the reviewing Appellate Court 
will not disturb a jury verdict so long as there is any 
evidence from which, together with fair inferences that 
may be drawn therefrom, reasonable minds could con-
clude as the jury did. See 
Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Ut. 2nd 287, 391 Pac. 
2nd 430; 
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Ut. 2nd 364, 412 Pac. 2nd 
451; and 
In Re Estate of Hubbard, 30 Ut. 2nd 260, 516 
Pac. 2nd 741. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR BY 
ADVISING THE JURY OF THE NATURE 
OF THE BOND, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B, 
AND COMMENTING THAT THE BOND-
ING COMPANY "INSOFAR AS THE COURT 
IS AWARE" WILL STAND ANY LOSS MR. 
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JOHNSON TAKES "MERELY BECAUSE 
HE IS A LANDOWNER." THE CLAIMED 
ERROR, IF ANY, IS HARMLESS. 
The Surety Bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, was stipu-
lated to be the original of the Bond furnished by Mr. 
Downard in connection with the job, as the Bond was 
furnished to the Johnsons and the Clarks, and was re-
ceived in evidence on that stipulation. (R. 245.) The 
one provision of the Bond which was specifically read to 
the jury and emphasized was the last paragraph on Page 
1 containing the proviso that in no event shall the surety 
company be subject to any suit action or other proceed-
ing thereto that is instituted later than 1 year after date 
of completion, which was March 11. (R. 246.) The Bond 
was in the jury's possession and available for review 
during the jury's deliberations. The record shows that 
after the court made its comment on the Bond and coun-
sel for appellants objected, the court then gave the fol-
lowing further instruction to the jury relating to the 
matter: 
You must understand that the question that 
is going to be put to you regarding — so that 
parties understand it before they rest complete-
ly on the evidence, — the issue will be between 
the plaintiff and the defendants and Johnson 
insofar as direct recovery of Bennetts against 
Johnson will depend upon whether or not Ben-
netts had reasonable access when asked for the 
Bond. If they had reasonable access to the Bond 
then they cannot go against Johnson as far as 
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this situation is concerned, but if they did, if 
Johnson did not make the Bond reasonably 
available to them . . . then he is not protected 
by the statute and then he is liable. (R. 302-
303.) (Emphasis Supplied.) 
Then, the case was not submitted for a general ver-
dict, but was submitted on a special interrogatory as to 
whether or not is was proven that Bennetts made de-
mand on Johnson to exhibit the Bond and that they did 
not reasonably comply. 
In the light of the court's immediate comment upon 
the true nature of the issue of fact, and in view of the 
nature of the special interrogatory submitted to the jury 
for its verdict, it cannot be presumed, or assumed, that 
the jury's special verdict was compelled or influenced 
by the fact that the judge said that "so far as he is 
aware" Johnson might have recourse against the bond-
ing company for any loss sustained because he was a 
landowner. The court's supplementary comment and in-
struction made it abundantly clear that the jury was 
concerned only with the evidence as to the demand for 
access to the Bond and the response thereto. 
Furthermore, the provision in the Bond limiting time 
for maintaining an action thereon was specifically called 
to the jury's attention and read to the jury when the 
Bond was introduced, and was again called the jury's 
attention by the nature of the objection made by ap-
pellants' counsel that "because of the passage of time 
the bonding company may say its not responsible and 
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that Mr. Johnson would have to file and pass along such 
claims within a certain time," and this was followed im-
mediately by the court's further instruction that the jury 
would be concerned only with the determination, on the 
evidence, of whether or not the Bennetts had reasonable 
access when they asked for the Bond. (R. 302.) 
Finally the court in its formal instructions carefully 
and correctly instructed the jury as to the issue to be 
decided with respect to the demand for and failure to 
exhibit the Bond, that the burden thereof was on the 
plaintiffs to prove the demond and the failure, and the 
customary instructions tihat the case must be decided 
solely upon the evidence received. The court further 
gave the standard instriiction to the effect that if the 
court had done anything which suggested that it is in-
clined to favor the claim or position of either party the 
jury would not permit itself to be influenced by any 
such suggestion. (Court's Instruction, R. 151, 152, 155, 
158 and 159.) 
And finally, it is respectfully submitted that it is 
clear under all of the circumstances that even if it should 
be considered that the court, in making the comment on 
the Bond complained of, committed a technical error* 
it was harmless end could not affect the ultimate, proper 
outcome of the trial in favor of the plaintiffs Bennett. 
First, it should be noted that Johnson at all material 
times had possession of the Bond and is charged with 
notice of its contents. From his own testimony it is 
apparent that he knew, long before the 1 year special 
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limitation elapsed, that Bennetts were asserting and pur-
suing a claim against him personally. If he failed to pre-
sent his claim, it was due to his own neglect and failure 
to attend to his business as a reasonable, prudent busi-
ness man. He cannot justly, equitably, or legally gain 
any advantage from his own neglect and default, as sug-
gested by the argument of appellants' counsel. And as 
a party to the Bond he cannot be heard to deny knowl-
edge of its contents. Indeed, in fairness to him and his 
counsel, it cannot be said that they do claim ignorance 
of the provisions of the Bond. 
Lastly, and even more important, as hereinabove 
demonstrated under Points I and II of this brief, Ben-
netts were entitled to judgment against the Johnsons 
and the Olarks because the Bond furnished was legally 
insufficient as a matter of law, irrespective of whether 
or not demand for the exhibit of the Bond had been made 
and refused. In view of the form of the Bond and the 
conduct of the defendant Johnson, which is undisputed, 
the Bond was insufficient under the statute, so that issue 
settled by the jury becomes irrelevant, immaterial and 
unnecessary to the proper decision of the case in favor 
of the Bennetts. 
For these reasons, the court's error in discussing the 
Bond with the jury, if any, was immaterial and harmless, 
and need not, and should not be considered in connection 
with the proper disposition of this appeal under the un-
disputed facts and the law. There is no reasonable like-
lihood that injustice has, in the end, resulted. In this 
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connection, see Lamb v. Bangart, Ut*, 525 Pac. 2nd 602, 
Haadmote 14 
The lower court's comments do not constitute re-
versible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given, it is respectfully submitted 
that the judgment of the court below in favor of the 
Bennetts and against the appellants Johnson and Clark 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
of YOUNG, THATCHER 
& GLASMANN 
and 
JOSEPH S. NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents Bennett 
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